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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
land.83 In Wood, the Court held that school officials were subject to an
action for damages under a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,84
where they unreasonably or unknowingly violate a student's constitutional
rights. 15 However, the Court granted school officials a limited immunity
whereby they would not be held liable if their action was undertaken "in
good-faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the bounds of
reason under all the circumstances." 86 Therefore, rather than begrudgingly
complying with the mandate of Goss, it is likely that school officials, in an
attempt to meet this standard, will establish some sort of Goss-type
procedures in order that they not be held personally liable for decisions
which adversely affect a student's rights.8 7
One can only surmise the extent to which the court will or will not
apply the rationale of Goss to educational decisions involving both more
severe disciplinary measures and other nondisciplinary actions. The de-
cision may have accomplished no more than stating the obvious - that any
rational parent in disciplining his or her own child would state the reasons
for so doing. 8 Or perhaps, the Court has finally rejected "the image of
the school administrator as a benign but infallible autocrat whose edicts can
be challenged only at peril of chaos in the schoolhouse."8 9
James J. Rohn
SECURITIES REGULATION - BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY OF
INQUIRY IMPOSED BY SECTION 17(a) OF SECURITIES AND EXCIANGE
ACT SUBJECTS ACCOUNTANT TO LIABILITY AS AIDER-ABETTOR OF
SECURITIES BROKER'S RULE 10b-5 VIOLATION.
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst (7th Cir. 1974)
Lester Nay, president and 92 percent shareholder of First Securities
Company of Chicago (FSC), induced plaintiffs, regular brokerage custo-
mers of FSC, to invest in a secret "escrow" account which Nay repre-
sented would yield a high rate of return.1 The account, in fact, was
nonexistent and Nay converted plaintiffs' funds to his own use.2 This
83. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
85. 420 U.S. at 322.
86. Id. at 321.
87. It should be noted that the impact of Wood has been somewhat ameliorated
by school board members' procurement of liability insurance. See Wall Street
Journal, March 18, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
88. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
89. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1975, at 24, col. 2.
1. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 1557 (1975) (No. 74-1042).
2. 503 F.2d at 1103.
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fraudulent scheme,3 violative of section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 4 and Securities and Exchange
Commission rule lOb-5, 5 promulgated thereunder, continued undetected
for a number of years until Nay disclosed the scheme in a suicide note.6
Defendant, a public accounting firm, audited FSC annually during the
time which Nay's fraud persisted, 7 preparing and filing Form X-17A-5
for FSC with the SEC" as required by section 17(a) of the Exchange
Act 9 and SEC rule 17a-5.' 0 Plaintiffs filed suit," alleging that the
3. Id. at 1103-04. Nay's conduct was found to be fraudulent in a prior, related
action. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972). See note 11 infra.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970). The statute provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means, or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
6. 503 F.2d at 1103.
7. Id.
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.617d; notes 52-54 and accompanying text infra.
9. Section 17(a), at the time of iistant decision, provided:
(a) Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker
or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such
member, every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer regis-
tered pursuant to section 78o of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such
periods, such accounts, correspondence and make such reports, as the Commission
by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 5, 52 Stat. 1076, amending Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 897 (repealed and superceded by Act of June 4,
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 14, 89 Stat. 137). The language of the new provision
(section 17 (a) (1)) is substantially similar to that of the former provision. See 3 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 26,151, at 19,201 (1975).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1974). For an explanation of the provisions of the
rule applicable to the instant case, see notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra.
11. Plaintiffs were parties in prior equitable receivership proceedings wherein
their claims against FSC were disallowed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that FSC was liable to plaintiffs as a result of Nay's fraud on theories of 1)
respondeat superior; 2) aiding and abetting; 3) "controlling person" under section 20
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970) ; and 4) violation of rule 27 of the Rules 2
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defendant had been negligent in auditing FSC, thereby aiding and abetting
Nay's rule lOb-5 fraud. 12  Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendant was negligent in failing to discover or adequately investigate an
alleged material inadequacy in the internal accounting control of FSC,
namely an office mail rule whereby all incoming mail addressed to Nay
or to FSC for Nay's attention was to be opened only by Nay, even when
he was away from the office for extended periods of time.13 Plaintiffs
alleged that this mail rule was instrumental in perpetuating the fraud,
and that discovery or investigation thereof would have prevented plain-
tiffs' financial loss. 14 The district court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that an auditor is liable to in-
vestors, such as plaintiffs, as an aider and abettor of a broker-dealer's
rule lOb-5 violation, where the auditor, through its negligence, has
breached the statutory duty of inquiry imposed by section 17(a), and
where, absent such breach, the underlying fraud would have been dis-
covered or prevented. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1557 (1975) (No. 74-1042).
The historical antecedents to the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)"1
and the Exchange Act are well-known. The legislative scheme sought
to regain and maintain investor confidence by requiring full disclosure
in the distribution and trading of securities 17 and, therefore, made fraud
of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers. SEC v. First Sec.
Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
In an action by plaintiffs against the Midwest Stock Exchange (Midwest),
the Seventh Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for defendant holding that, as a
matter of law, Midwest had not failed in its duty to regulate FSC and Nay, and that,
therefore, Midwest could not be liable as an aider and abettor of Nay's fraud. Hoch-
felder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
875 (1974).
12. 503 F.2d at 1104.
13. Id. at 1109.
14. Id. at 1115.
15. Id. at 1103. The district court opinion is unreported. In its motion for sum-
mary judgment, the defendant, advanced the following arguments: 1) that whatever
duties defendant assumed as an auditor, those duties extended to a class of persons -
"regular" customers of FSC - from which plaintiffs, as escrow customers dealing
privately with Nay, knowingly excluded themselves; 2) that defendant, as a matter
of law, met the professional standard of care required for the audit; 3) that, as a
matter of law, defendant's conduct could not have caused plaintiffs' injuries; 4) that
defendant could not have aided and abetted Nay's fraud, as a matter of law, in the
absence of knowledge of or participation in such fraud; 5) that plaintiffs were estopped
from asserting defendant's liability due to failure to inform defendant, upon request, of
the open escrow accounts; and 6) that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable
3-year statute of limitations. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2-3. The
district court held for defendant on the estoppel and statute of limitations issues. 503
F.2d at 1118-19. See note 64 infra.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
17. See generally 35 SEc. ANN. REPORT 25 (1969).
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and unfairness subject to civil and criminal sanctions.18 Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act forbids "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC]
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors."19 In 1942, pursuant to this grant of rule-
making authority, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5,20 essentially render-
ing unlawful the use of fraud or manipulation by any person in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. The rule lay virtually dormant
for 4 years until a federal district court held that an implied private
cause of action for violation of the rule existed.2 1 As a result of the uni-
versal adoption of this principle by federal courts22 and the transactional
breadth of rule lOb-5, it has become the most important antifraud pro-
vision in the securities laws.2 3 With the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court, rule lOb-5 has been expansively interpreted,24 resulting in the
inclusion, by inventive plaintiffs, of greater numbers of parties as defend-
ants. Consequently, the rule 10b-5 net has been enlarged to include not
only those liable for direct violations, but also those found accountable
under one or more of the following secondary liability25 concepts: 1)
18. For a brief discussion and compilation of the various antifraud provisions of
the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act, see 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5
§§ 3.01-02, 10.01-.02 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS].
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970). For the full text of this section, see note 4 supra.
20. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). For the
text of the rule, see note 5 supra.
21. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Neither
section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 expressly provides for private rights of action. Most
courts which have implied a private cause of action for violation of rule 10b-5 have
done so without discussion of the theoretical basis. See note 43 infra for a description
of the various theories used to support the implication of a private right of action
under rule 10b-5.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has never confronted the
issue, it has explicitly recognized the existence of implied private relief for a violation
of rule 10b-5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1923 (1975)
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
22. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.4(1) (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG] ; JACOBS, supra note 18, § 8.02.
23. As one prescient commentator remarked, "If Rule X-10B-5 stood alone as
a source of private civil remedies, its terms would be broad enough to blanket almost
all malpractices in securities transactions." Note, The Prospects for Rule X-lOB-5:
An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120-30 (1950). Law
review material on rule lob-5 is multitudinous and, therefore, is not cited. For citations
to this material, see 1-3 BROMBERG, supra note 22; JAcoBs, supra note 18.
24. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971);
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
25. On the continuum of conduct which will give rise to rule 10b-5 accountability,
the lines dividing the concepts of direct, or primary, liability and secondary participa-
tion are blurred. Generally, primary liability under the rule obtains for those who are
a party to the violative securities transaction, breach a duty to the plaintiff, or directly
participate in a violation. Secondary liability normally arises where another person
has violated rule lOb-5, and the secondary party, whose conduct by itself would not
be unlawful, has in some manner assisted, encouraged, facilitated, or conspired with
regard to the primary wrongdoer's actions. See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 22,
§ 8.5 (515) ; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
1084 [VOL. 20
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aiding and abetting;26 2) conspiracy;27 3) "controlling person" under
section 20 of the Exchange Act ;28 or 4) agency principles.2 9
The concept of private civil liability for aiding and abetting a rule
lOb-5 violation has two principal bases. First, federal courts, inter-
preting the various antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the Exchange
Act (hereinafter, when referred to jointly, the Securities Acts), have
relied heavily upon tort and criminal law theory.80 Second, the SEC
has long employed the concept in its own internal disciplinary proceed-
ings as well as in civil injunction actions. 3' Although there is abundant
case law involving allegations of aiding and abetting a rule lOb-5 viola-
tion, it is difficult to derive from it a precise elucidation of the concept.
Generally, to support a finding of actionable aiding and abetting, the
courts have required allegations or proof of both 1) knowledge of the
conduct of the primary wrongdoer and 2) affirmative assistance,8 2 or
silence and inaction where a duty to speak or act exists. 33 Hochfelder
marks the first time a circuit court of appeals has posited a theory of
liability in damages for aiding and abetting a rule lOb-5 violation where
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA.
L. REv. 597, 600 (1972).
26. The leading case adopting the principle that liability may be imposed upon
a secondary party for aiding and abetting a rule lob-5 fraud is Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
27. See, e.g., Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The concept
of liability for conspiracy to violate rule lob-5 is still developing. As with aiding and
abetting, the courts discussing civil liability for conspiracy have relied heavily upon
analogous principles of criminal law. See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 22, § 8.5
(540) ; JACOBS, supra note 18, § 40.03; Ruder, supra note 25, at 63841.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970). See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972). See generally Comment, The Controlling
Persons Provisions: Conduits of Secondary Liability Under Federal Securities Laws,
19 VILL. L. REV. 621 (1974).
29. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972).
30. See, e.g., Fisher v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See generally
Ruder, supra note 25, at 612-18, 620-22, 626-28.
31. Id. at 624. The SEC's use of this concept in its own disciplinary proceedings
is pursuant to section 15(b) (5) (E) of the Exchange Act which provides for sus-
pension of registration of a broker or dealer who has wilfully aided or abetted a
violation of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (E) (1970).
32. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (defendant stock exchange held liable
where, with knowledge of broker's fraudulent conduct, it referred customers' com-
plaints thereof to the broker, allowing broker to placate complaints and continue
fraudulent scheme).
33. Compare Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 739-40 (10th Cir.
1974) with Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971). It is arguable that
where defendant knows of another's violation of rule lOb-5 and breaches a legal duty
to plaintiff to speak or act in order to defray this violation, defendant's liability is
primary, as a breach of a legal duty, and not secondary as an aider-abettor of the
violation. See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944). 5
Kircher: Securities Regulation - Breach of Statutory Duty of Inquiry Impos
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the alleged aider and abettor was merely negligent in failing to discover
the underlying fraud, concededly having had no knowledge of it.34
Although in the instant case the theoretical basis for defendant's
liability was couched in terms of aiding and abetting, the decision rested
sub silentio upon two developing areas of federal securities law which are:
1) the duties and liabilities of accountants under the Securities Acts ;85
and 2) implied private causes of action for violation of their provisions.3 6
The independent certified public accountant (accountant) plays a
cardinal role in the application of the Securities Acts,8 7 as the account-
ant's independence and expertise are generally relied upon by both the
public and the SEC to obtain full financial disclosure in the market.88
34. The knowledge requirement has not been discussed in the great majority of
rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting cases because defendant's knowledge of the underlying
violation could not be disputed. It should be noted that in many of the cases plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the defendant "knew or should have known," and the court,
usually a district court ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action, held the mere allegation of knowledge to be sufficient, viewing the
"should have known" language in the complaint as surplusage. See, e.g., Pettit v.
American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Additionally, in
civil actions where the SEC is seeking injunctive relief, courts have recognized
that because the relief sought is not as inimical to defendants as in private suits
seeking damages, and because the interests of investor protection are furthered,
"[i]t is not necessary . . . to establish all the elements required in a suit for money
damages." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973), noted in 19
VILL. L. REV. 932 (1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Thus, courts have held that
a "knew or should have known" standard is sufficient in injunction actions due to the
nature of the proceeding. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) ;
SEC v. Iannelli, 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see SEC
v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
The American Law Institute's 1974 revision of its proposed Federal Securities
Code takes the position that liability for aiding and abetting a securities law violation
requires a showing of defendant's actual knowledge that the primary wrongdoer's
conduct was unlawful. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE 1419(b) (1) (Reporter's Revision
of Text of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, 1974).
35. See generally Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities
Under the Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO
STATE L.J. 261 (1974) ; Kurland, Accountants Legal Liability Ultramares to BarChris,
25 Bus. LAW. 155, 161-68 (1969); Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants'
Liability to Third Parties, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 113, 126-38 (1971); Sonde, The
Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws - Some Observa-
tions, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1973) ; Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to Third Parties
Under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 137
(1967).
36. See generally Note, An Implied Private Right of Action Under Section
16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155 (1971) ;
Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes; Judicial
Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
441 (1974); Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963). For a recent Supreme Court application of the law in
this area, in a nonsecurities context, see Cort v. Ash, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975).
37. See Sonde, supra note 35, at 2.
38. See Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957) ; Cornucopia
Gold Mines, 1 S.E.C. 364, 367 (1936).
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This is accomplished through the statutorily required preparation of
year-end statements, prospectuses, registration statements, and reports of
financial condition, all certified by accountants as fairly presenting the
fiscal health of the entity involveda9 In this respect, federal courts have
recently recognized that accountants, when performing their auditing and
presenting functions40 in the securities area, are responsible not only to
their clients, but also to the investing public. 41 Concomitantly, the courts
have broadened the scope of civil liability of accountants in order to
ensure that these functions are diligently performed. This expanding
scope of liability has been facilitated in part through the still developing
judicial doctrine of the implied private cause of action.42 Briefly stated,
the doctrine concerns when a court should extend private relief to a plain-
tiff harmed by a defendant's infraction of a statute or regulation which
does not expressly provide such relief.43 Private causes of action have
frequently been implied under the Securities Acts.4 4 The courts holding
39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-g, j, s, aa; 78m, n, g (1970).
40. Although case law has not made this distinction, the accountant performs two
separate functions before certifying a financial statement as fairly presenting the fiscal
condition of an entity. Auditing, the function examined in the instant case, essentially
entails an accountant's thorough investigation and testing of the entity's books, records,
and internal accounting procedures. This is to ensure as much as possible the veracity
of the figures given to the accountant for his Presentation, embodied in a certified
financial report which is intended to be a clear, comprehensive and accurate statement
of the entity's financial condition. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS: CODIFICATION OF
AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES § 110 (1973). For a recent analysis of the
presenting function, see Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378
F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
41. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F.
Supp. 112, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
42. See note 36 supra.
43. Courts have employed various tests to determine whether there should be
implied a private right of action for a violation of rule 10b-5. In the seminal case,
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the court
applied a statutory tort theory, citing section 286 of the Restatement of Torts which
provides that a private right of action is implied where plaintiff's interests are invaded
due to defendant's breach of a statute designed to protect those interests. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 286 (1934). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (a
court may imply private relief).
Statutory voidability is a second basis which courts have utilized to imply
private relief under rule lOb-5. This theory is premised upon section 29(b) of the
Exchange Act, which declares as void contracts made or performed in violation of the
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). Courts have reasoned that if a contract is statu-
torily rendered void then necessarily and impliedly the innocent party to the contract
should be able to sue in respect of it. The Kardon court applied this as an alternative
theory. 69 F. Supp. at 514.
A third basis for implication of private relief is statutory inference. This
theory was employed by the Supreme Court in J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
to imply a private right of action under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1970), and would appear to be applicable to rule lOb-5. For a general
discussion of the bases of implied private rights of action under rule lOb-5, see
BROMBERG, supra note 22 §§ 2.4(1) (a)-(d) ; JACOBS, supra note 18, §§ 8.01-.02.
44. Implied private rights of action, besides having been recognized under rule
lOb-5 (see note 21 supra) and section 14(a) of the Exchange Act (see note 43 supra),
have also been found in connection with other provisions of the Securities Acts. See
1974-19751 1087
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in favor of such implication have generally done so because they regarded
the Securities Acts as a legislative scheme specifically designed to ensure
investor protection, and the implication of private civil remedies as neces-
sary to accomplish this goal. 45
The Hochfelder court began its analysis by defining the necessary
elements of a cause of action for aiding and abetting a rule lOb-5 viola-
tion in cases where it is claimed that the defendant has facilitated the
fraud through inaction as well as action. This formula consisted of the
following components:
(1) that the defendant had a duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was
a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry; (3) the defendant breached the
duty of inquiry; (4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry
the defendant breached a duty of disclosure; and (5) there is a
causal connection between the breach of duty of inquiry and disclosure
and the facilitation of the underlying fraud; that is, adequate inquiry
and subsequent disclosure would have led to the discovery of the
underlying fraud or its prevention. 46
The remainder of the opinion sought to demonstrate the existence of the
first two of the foregoing elements, as a matter of law, and the presence
of genuine issues of fact with regard to the latter three elements, sufficient
to require the reversal of summary judgment for defendant.
The court, having adopted by the terms of its formula a standard of
negligence47 for aiding and abetting a rule lOb-5 violation, proceeded
to examine whether the defendant owed a duty of inquiry of which plain-
tiffs were "beneficiaries. '48 Initially determining that plaintiffs could not
avail themselves of defendant's common law duty of inquiry,49 the court
turned to section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and stated that
rwlithout reaching the question of whether there is implicit in section
17(a) a direct duty flowing to the plaintiffs, it is enough for pur-
poses of proving defendant's aid and abetment of a Rule lOb-5
violation that the extant duty of inquiry imposed on [defendant] is
Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944)
(section 6(b) of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970); Grow Chem. Corp. v.
Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (section 16(a) of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a) (1970)); Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969),
af'd, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1972) (section 13(d) of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)) (1970) ; Rader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (section
7 of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970)); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (section 17(a) of 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970)).
45. See, e.g., J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
46. 503 F.2d at 1104.
47. See note 69 infra.
48. 503 F.2d at 1105-07.
49. Id. at 1107. The court stated that the defendant had a common law duty of
inquiry, arising out of the audit contract with FSC. However, this common law duty
of inquiry did not inure to plaintiffs' benefit as plaintiffs were neither privy to the
contract, third party beneficiaries, nor foreseeable reliants upon defendant's conduct.
503 F.2d at 1105-07. For further discussion of this common law duty of accountants,
see materials cited in note 35 supra.
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grounded on a concern for the protection of investors such as the
plaintiffs.5 0
Section 17(a) required registered securities broker-dealers to file such
financial reports as the SEC may have deemed necessary and appropriate for
investor protection.51 Rule 17a-5, promulgated pursuant to section 17(a),
requires broker-dealers to file with the SEC detailed annual reports of
financial condition on Form X-17A-5, 52 which must be certified by an
accountant, Significantly, the Form contains a set of audit require-
ments including a mandate that the audit conducted by the accountants
be in accordance with "generally accepted accounting principles."5 4 Thus,
the Hochfelder court found extant a statutory duty of inquiry which the
defendant had assumed when it had agreed to prepare the Form for
FSC.5 5 More importantly, the court further determined that plaintiffs
were beneficiaries of this duty because Congress had intended that these
financial disclosure rules be enforced for the protection of investors.5
Presumably, in designating the plaintiffs as beneficiaries, the court meant
that the plaintiffs were entitled to enforce the statutory duty of inquiry,
if breached, in a private suit for damages.
Having established as a matter of law the existence of the first two
elements of its aiding and abetting formula,57 the court determined that,
as to the last three elements, there existed genuine issues of fact in dis-
pute. With respect to the first of these three elements, breach of the duty
of inquiry, the court viewed the opposing affidavits filed on the motion
for summary judgment as sufficient to require remand for trial of the
questions of whether the so-called "mail rule"5 8 was a material inade-
quacy in FSC's internal accounting control,59 and if so, whether the
50. 503 F.2d at 1105.
51. For the former text of section 17(a), see note 9 supra.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(a) (2) (1974).
53. Id. § 240.17a-5(b) (1).
54. 32 Fed. Reg. 14018, 14022 (1967) (the actual forms required to be filed
under various rules and regulations of the SEC, including Form X-17A-5, are gener-
ally not printed in the Code of Federal Regulations). Form X-17A-5 requires the
broker-dealer to set forth, inter alia, current bank balances, money borrowed, customers
securities collateralized, commodity accounts maintained, capital accounts and
general partners' individual accounts. Id. at 14018-22.
55. 503 F.2d at 1105.
56. Id.
57. For the Hochfelder court's construction of the formula, see text accom-
panying note 46 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
59, 503 F.2d at 1111. Internal accounting control has been defined as:
The plan of organization and all methods and procedures that are concerned
mainly with, and relate directly to, safeguarding of assets and the reliability of
the financial records. They generally include such controls as the systems of
authorization and approval, separation of duties concerned with record keeping
and accounting reports from those concerned with operations or asset custody,
physical control over assets, and internal auditing.
Id. at 1109-10, quoting AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES; STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No.
33 at 28 (1963).
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defendant failed to exercise the proper standard of care6" in failing to
discover such inadequacy.
The court, continuing with its aiding and abetting formula, concluded
that if it were found that the defendant had breached the statutory duty
of inquiry, then necessarily it would have breached its duty of disclosure. 61
The court reasoned that the accountant, pursuant to its duty to conduct
the audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing principles, im-
plicitly had a separate and distinct duty to disclose any "material inade-
quacy" in internal accounting control. 62 Thus, by failing to uncover and
identify this "material inadequacy," the defendant necessarily breached
its duty of disclosure as a matter of law. 8
Whether such inquiry into and disclosure of the underlying fraud
would have prevented plaintiffs' financial injury is the ultimate causation
question, and, in the instant case, the court remanded this issue for trial.6 4
60. The instant court held the defendant to "the standard of care which gener-
ally prevailed in the accounting profession during Ernst & Ernst's audits of First
Securities." 503 F.2d at 1108. Compare Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (accountants held to a standard of care required by
generally accepted accounting standards, where accountants are auditing materials in
connection with the public distribution of securities) with Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (generally accepted
accounting principles do not comprise the required standard of care where accountant
presents financial report, but rather the proper inquiry is whether the financial report
fairly presents the actual financial condition of the entity to the untutored eye of
an ordinary investor). For an explanation of the contrast between these functions,
see note 40 supra.
61. 503 F.2d at 1114.
62. The court stated:
More specifically, the duty, as part of generally accepted auditing standards,
to investigate internal accounting controls, necessarily implies that any material
inadequacy in those controls will be disclosed.
503 F.2d at 1114 (footnote omitted). The court, in a passage immediately prior to
the above-quoted language, suggested that the defendant had not only made a mis-
representation, but also had failed to comply with the disclosure requirement of
rule 17a-5(g) (2) (B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g) (2) (B) (1974), when it neglected to
state in its audit certificate that the audit had not been made in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. It is not clear what the court intended by
these remarks, especially in light of the fact that a theory of liability based upon
misrepresentation implores an injuiry into reliance, an element which plaintiffs and
the court conceded did not exist in this case. 503 F.2d at 1107.
63. The practical result of the court's analysis is that where there occurs a
breach of the duty of inquiry, the court will assume there to be a corollary breach
of a duty of disclosure, at least where the discovery of facts, which went undiscovered,
would have given rise to an independent duty of disclosure. The court appears to
be saying that for purposes of causation analysis it will assume that defendant would
have disclosed to the SEC or to the client the existence of a material inadequacy in
the client's internal accounting control.
64. 503 F.2d at 1115. The court also briefly considered two ancillary issues:
estoppel and the statute of limitations. Defendant had successfully argued these
issues in the district court (see note 15 svpra), but the instant court reversed and
remanded in both instances. 503 F.2d at 1118-19. The thrust of defendant's estoppel
argument was that plaintiffs had neglected, in their responses to defendant's requests
for written confirmations of accounts, to take exception to the failure of the con-
firmation request to list the escrow transactions. Confirmation of open accounts
entails the accountant communicating directly with the debtors or creditors of the
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As noted above, the primary significance of Hochfelder is that the
plaintiff successfully pleaded a cause of action for aiding and abetting a
violation of rule lOb-5 premised on a "should have known" standard, '
The propriety of the application of this standard for liability in this con-
text must be examined. In tort 6 and criminal law, 67 accountability
under an aiding and abetting theory generally requires a finding that the
defendant had knowledge of another's unlawful or improper conduct and
substantially assisted or encouraged that conduct. The state of mind re-
audited entity, presenting to them the precise manner in which their account, i.e.,
their debit or credit position, is currently carried on the books of the audited entity,
and asking for verification thereof or exception thereto. This procedure is required
by Form X-17A-5 in the course of a rule 17a-5 audit. See 32 Fed. Reg. 14018,
14022 (1967). Claiming material reliance upon this prior failure to object, de-
fendant contended that plaintiffs were now estopped from doing so. The court dis-
agreed, holding that there was a material issue of fact to be resolved at trial as to
whether "a reasonable investor of similar business sophistication and intelligence as
plaintiffs would have reached no other conclusion but that disclosure of the escrow
account was called for by the confirmation request." 503 F.2d at 1118.
The court likewise rejected defendant's contention that the defense of statute
of limitations was valid as a matter of law. Id. at 1119. The court said that although
the applicable 3-year statute of limitations had run prior to plaintiffs' filing their
complaint, there was an unresolved question of fact as to whether and when plain-
tiffs knew or should have known of Nay's fraud. Id. If it were found that the
plaintiffs should not have known during the applicable time period, the court stated
that plaintiffs could invoke the equitable tolling doctrine which would bar the
statute of limitations defense. Id. The court explained that the
equitable tolling doctrine provides that where a fraud which is the foundation
of the suit has actively been concealed or is of such a nature as to conceal itself,
the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff has obtained knowledge of
the fraud or in the exercise of due care should have obtained knowledge of
the fraud.
Id., quoting Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 375 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974). See also Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233,
1240-41 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). Plaintiffs' diligence in their
dealings with Nay, the perpetrator of the rule 10b-5 fraud, is brought into question
not only with respect to the statute of limitations issue, but arguably could act as a
broader defense to liability, in the form of contributory negligence. See Clement A.
Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988
(1971). But see Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970). For a more detailed account of plaintiffs' conduct in
relation to the escrow transactions, see SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 983-85
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
65. Defendant argued on appeal that it could not be liable for aiding and abetting
Nay's fraud, as a matter of law, since it was conceded that the defendant had no
knowledge of Nay's misconduct. 503 F.2d at 1104. The instant court dismissed
this argument in summary fashion, finding support for the "should have known"
standard from language in a related case previously decided by the Seventh Circuit,
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 875 (1974). 503 F.2d at 1104. See note 11 supra. Inexplicably, the court
failed to discuss a 1973 decision of the Seventh Circuit, Sennott v. Rodman & Ren-
shaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973), which had refused
to find aiding and abetting liability absent a showing of knowledge of the underlying
rule 10b-5 violation.
66. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
67. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 64 (1972).
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quirement is important for it prevents the imposition of liability for
unwitting assistance or facilitation of the criminal or tortious act. 8
There appears to be no compelling reason to treat aiding and abetting
a rule lOb-5 violation differently. While the imposition of a negligence
standard 0 would certainly serve to deter securities fraud by requiring
parties to investigate the activities of those with whom they deal, it is
submitted that the liability sought under this theory is obtainable on nar-
rower, more direct theoretical grounds, 70 thus avoiding any problems
of an unreasonably burdensome imposition of liability on secondary de-
fendants. Aiding and abetting a violation of rule lOb-5, at least as a
concept of liability in private actions for damages, 71 should require proof
of knowing assistance or encouragement, thereby continuing to serve
profitably the purposes for which it was created. 72
It is suggested that, in prior private actions for damages where there
is language to support a theory of negligent aiding and abetting a rule
lOb-5 violation, defendant's liability to plaintiff arose independently of
such theory. 73 Typically, defendant owed to the plaintiff, and breached,
68. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
69. The negligence referred to is with respect to an extant duty to inquire, or
to come to the knowledge of another's misconduct. This strain of negligence is
contrasted with the situation where the defendant knew of the misconduct, and then
solely breached a duty of disclosure, either intentionally or negligently. See notes
33 & 62 supra.
Additionally, it should be noted that the issue of whether knowledge should
be an absolute requirement for liability for aiding and abetting a violation of rule
lb-5 is wholly separate from the question of whether intent or negligence is re-
quired for primary liability under rule 10b-5. See note 85 and accompanying text
infra.
70. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text infra.
71. See note '34 supra, describing the different judicial treatment of actions for
damages and equitable actions vis-A-vis the necessary elements for a rule lob-5
cause of action.
72. Aiding and abetting liability, as with other theories of secondary liability,
is a by-product of the judicial relaxation of privity as a required element of a rule
lOb-5 action. See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 22, § 8.5 (515). The broad
language of the rule (e.g., "any person," "directly or indirectly," "in connection with")
and the approved policy of flexible interpretation of the rule so as to effectuate the
remedial purposes of the Exchange Act (note 24 and accompanying text supra),
are perhaps the most viable reasons why privity is no longer an absolute require-
ment and why the scope of rule lob-5 liability has expanded to include certain
secondary participants. Privity as a limiting doctrine on the scope of rule 10b-5 has
given way to other limiting devices - for example, the purchaser-seller requirement
as reiterated by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975) - but this does not mean that the plaintiff does not have
to allege or prove some pronounced connection with the violation or that theories
of secondary liability are without limits themselves. See Wessel v. Buhler, 437
F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
For an illustration of the multiple uses to which a court has put the aiding
and abetting concepts while retaining the knowledge requirement, see In re Caesars
Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
73. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410
F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Northway, Inc. v. TSC
Indus., Inc., 361 F. Supp. 108, 117-20 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (separate opinion reported
as appendix) ; Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104
(W.D. Ark. 1949).
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a preexisting duty to monitor, supervise, or, in some way investigate the
activities of the third party perpetrator of the rule 10b-5 fraud. 74 - In
these situations, there would appear to be no need to redefine the elements.
of aiding and abetting in an attempt to find a basis for secondary liability
where primary liability, apart from rule lOb-5, potentially obtains. It is
submitted that, if there exists a direct duty of inquiry running to the
plaintiff, or one can be implied, 75 liability should arise in this uncompli-
cated fashion, and conventional principles of tort law should be applied
as in other situations where a breach of duty results in direct liability.
Although the Hochfelder court expressly declined to rule upon the
existence of a direct duty to plaintiffs under section 17(a), 7 6 the "indirect"
duty which it created will bear substantially the same results. Under the
instant court's theory, a private plaintiff seeking redress for breach of
the "indirect" duty created under section 17(a) will be able to do so
where he can show that the wrong perpetrated by the broker-dealer, who
is the subject of the rule 17a-5 audit, falls within the scope of rule lOb-5,
or, arguably, any of the other antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts
applicable to broker-dealers.7 7 In light of the fact that rule lOb-5 has
been interpreted to encompass almost all securities malpractices imagi-
nable, 7  the direct-indirect duty delineation drawn by the Hochfelder
court is of relatively little consequence in terms of ultimate liability.
The implication by the court of a private remedy for breach of the
indirect duty of inquiry appears to be supportable under the rationale
adopted by the Supreme Court in J.1. Case v. Borak.7 9  In addressing
itself to the question of whether a private cause of action was implied in
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act,80 the Borak Court stated:
While [section 14 (a)] makes no specific reference to a private right
of action, among its chief purposes is "the protection of investors,"
74. The duty generally arises out of the recognition of a special relationship
between the defendant and the third party primary wrongdoer. See Buttrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 838 (1969).
75. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
76. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
77. Sections 8 and 15 of the Exchange Act, and SEC rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, regulate the activities of securities broker-dealers. 15
U.S.C. §§ 78h, o (1970) ; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15a-Aj (1974). It is arguable, under the
Hochfelder court's analysis, that.if accountants can be liable to brokerage customers
for negligently failing to discover facts which would lead to the uncovering of a
violation of rule 10b-5 in the course of a rule 17 a-5 audit, then the same liability
could obtain with respect to any broker-dealer misconduct which violates any of
the regulatory provisions set out above and results in financial loss to brokerage
customers.
78. In Courtland v. Walston & Co., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
the court said that rule 10b-5 can be "considered to support private litigation for
practically any sin of omission or commission which may be imagined in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security." Id. at 1083.
79. •377 U.S. 426 (1964). See note 43 supra.
80. 15 U.S.C..§ 78n(a). (1970). •
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which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where neces-
sary to achieve that result."'
The instant court was likewise mindful of furthering this protective pur-
pose.8 2 However, it would seem salubrious to reach the same result by
the less awkward method of creating a direct duty to plaintiff and thereby
avoiding the conceptual problems of assimilating the duty into an aiding
and abetting formula.8 3
Although the conservative practice of earlier courts, in interpreting
rule lOb-5, of requiring fulfillment of the traditional elements of common
law fraud has given way to modification or elimination of these require-
ments under the guise of furthering the remedial purposes of the legisla-
tion,8 4 the various circuit courts have taken different positions on what
state of mind should be required for rule lOb-5 liability - the so-called
"scienter" issue.85 Even though a jurisdictional count appears to favor a
negligence standard,80 it is submitted that where secondary liability such
as aiding and abetting is sought to be attached, knowing assistance of
the primary wrongful conduct should be required.8 7 Digression from this
standard threatens an unreasonable imposition of liability on secondary
participants to a rule lOb-5 violation.88 For this reason, and other con-
81. 377 U.S. at 432, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
82. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
83. It can only be surmised that those courts, such as Hochfelder, which adopt
the aiding and abetting analysis to establish liability, are apprehensive about the
creation or maintenance of a direct duty, and feel less vulnerable to criticism when
working the cause of action through the lOb-5 maze. A cursory reading of the
court's announced aiding and abetting formula reveals a striking dissimilarity to
traditional aiding and abetting theory. See text accompanying note 46 supra. The
formula, when viewed in isolation, is that of a direct duty of inquiry running from
the defendant to the private plaintiff. When the formula is viewed in the instant
context, the result is an unnecessary strain on aiding and abetting doctrine and an
attempt to confer relief for breach of an independent duty without directly creating
that duty. It is submitted that had the plaintiffs alleged, or the court examined
sua sponte, a direct duty to plaintiffs arising from a provision of the Securities Acts,
the court's analysis would have been identical.
84. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court held that a defrauded seller need not show
reliance but that reliance may be presumed, at least in situations where the defendant
has omitted to state a material fact in connection with the purchase of securities.
Id. at 153-54.
85. Compare Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d
514, 517 (10th Cir. 1973) (negligence is a sufficient standard) with Shemtob v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (scienter, intent to
defraud, reckless disregard for truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud is required). See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 22, § 8.4; JAcOBS,
supra note 18, § 63.
86. See, e.g., Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969).
87. See notes 66-72 and accompanying text supra.
88. Primary participants in a violation of rule lOb-5 are generally cognizant
that their conduct is related, or contributes, to the finalizing of a securities trans-
action. In this respect, a negligence standard for primary wrongdoers may be
justifiable in order to encourage diligence in activity so closely related to securities
trading. However, secondary defendants often are not aware that their conduct is
14
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ceptual reasons previously discussed, the instant court's adoption of a
"should have known" standard as an element of the aiding and abetting
doctrine appears to be problematical. However, where the analysis of
liability is in terms of a direct duty, as would have been the case had the
Hochfelder court elected to treat section 17(a) in this manner, a negli-
gence standard seems to rest on solid ground. Given the fact that account-
ants have been judicially recognized as occupying a special relationship
with the investing public and a special role in the application of the
Securities Acts,89 that the standard of care required is the professional
standard which the accountants themselves formulate,90 and that the duty
established in the instant decision applies only in the course of rule 17a-5
audits of broker-dealers, the negligence standard appears neither oppres-
sive nor unnecessary. Rather, it would appear to further the purposes
of the Securities Acts, consistent with the Borak rationale, 91 by creating
extra-agency "policemen" in the form of auditors. As a consequence of
the decision in Hochfelder, accountants conducting rule 17a-5 audits will
most probably expand the scope and intensity of their audits, and, accord-
ingly, increase their fees.
Philip G. Kircher
affecting or facilitating a securities transaction, and thus the application of a negli-
gence standard would not operate to encourage diligence therein. Cf. Wessel v.
Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
89. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra. See also Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104-05 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
90. See note 60 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
10951974-1975]
15
Kircher: Securities Regulation - Breach of Statutory Duty of Inquiry Impos
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
